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In The 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TIMPANOGOS HIGHLANDS, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant and 
Counter-Respondent, 
vs. 
EMILY D. HARPER and . 
MAX D. HARPER, 
Defendants-Respondents 
and Counter-Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant reaffirms its statement of facts of its 
initial brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SUB-
STANTIATE APPELLANT'S ABANDON-
MENT OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Respondents' brief cites numerous cases with 
the stated intention of proving that Appellant aban-
doned the Uniform Real Estate Contract with the Re-
spondents. In reality these cases provide nothing 
more than a catalog of various factors considered by 
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.different courts as shedding light on whether, under 
the facts of those cases, an abandonment was in-
tended. All of the cases cited are factually distin-
guishable from the case at hand. Some factors are 
present, some factors are absent and all factors appear 
in degrees varying from the facts of this case. 
From an evidentiary standpoint, the acts con-
stituting abandonment must be positive, unequivoc-
al, and inconsistent with the continuation of the con-
tract. 91CJS Vendor and Purchaser, § 120. None of the 
factors relied on by Respondents is positive, un-
equivocal or inconsistent with the continuation of the 
contract. Again, the evidence of the multiple contacts 
between Appellant and Respondents between 1969 
and 1973 demonstrate a continuing intent of Appel-
lant to continue the contractural relationship. 
It has been often stated that the law abhors a 
forfeiture. To uphold the trial court's decision of 
abandonment would work a forfeiture of Appellant's 
investment of $24,150.00 and create a windfall for the 
Respondents. 
Respondents refer to the inconsistent pay-
ments made by Appellants through 1968 and the total 
default in payments thereafter. If dissatisfied with 
payments, Respondents should have demanded full 
compliance with the contract and should have given 
notice to formally begin forfeiture. Specific De-
velopment Company v. Stewart, 195 P. 2d 748 (1948). 
Instead, Respondents sat back, allowed Appellant to 
make multiple contacts between 1968 and 1973 seek-
ing figures whereby the contract could be brought 
current, and failed to make any positive effort to 
either give Appellant the information sought or to 
give notice of delinquency. 
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si As stated in Appellant's initial brief, Respon-
dents have failed to show an abandonment by Appel-
lant, and therefore this Court should reverse the trial 
court. 
POINT II 
PROOF OF APPELLANT'S OWNERSHIP IN-
TEREST IN THE PROPERTY HAS NO BEAR-
ING ON THE ADEQUACY OF PLAINTIFF'S 
TENDER 
Respondents' brief makes reference to four 
reasons why Appellant's tender was not proper. Re-
spondents cite no authority in support of this alleged 
impropriety of tender. 
The first reason stated centers around the fact 
that the check was not made payable directly to the 
Respondents. This argument is without merit in that 
the check was properly endorsed by an agent of the 
Appellant and could have been negotiated by the 
Respondents. 
The other reasons cited by Respondents center 
on the fact that the Respondents claim not to have 
known of Appellant's interest in the property and 
further, that Appellant did not have a recorded in-
terest in the property at the time that the tender was 
made. These reasons are without merit in that Appel-
lant need not prove its title before making tender. 
Respondents' only obligation is to convey title in 
acordance with the original Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract. The burden for insuring clear title would rest 
with Appellant. 
Therefore, Respondents' argument concerning 
the inadequacy of Appellant's tender is without 
merit. 
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BRIEF OF COUNTER-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counter-Respondent accepts Counter-
Appellants ' statement of the dates upon which the 
documents were recorded. 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
COUNTER-APPELLANTS' COUNTERCLAIM 
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE AND COUNTER-
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
HAVE SUCH CLAIM REINSTATED. 
Counter-Appellants state that the recordation 
of the documents referred to as constituting slander of 
title occurred subsequent to the abandonment of the 
property. At the time of recording there had been no 
abandonment and the trial court's findings and 
judgment do not place a time certain on when an 
abandonment took place. This reference to a post-
abandonment recording is obviously made to imply 
the malicious recording of an untrue document. 
The publisher of matter disparaging to 
another's property and land is not liable unless the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
disparaging matter, if a statement of fact, is untrue, or, 
if an expression of opinion is dishonestly made. Pen-
der vs. Dowse, 265 P. 2d 644 (1954). 50 Am Jur 2d, 
Liable and Slander, § 549. The documents which 
were recorded were true documents representing 
Counter-Respondent's actual interest in the real 
property. In no way could these documents be chal-
lenged as untrue. 
Additionally, the recording statutes provide 
for recordation of one's interest in land for one's own 
protection, and a privilege to protect one's interest is 
recognized. 50 Am Jur 2d, Liable and Slander, § 547. 
For these reasons Counter-Appellants' claim is 
without merit and the decision of the trial court in 
dismissing the counterclaim was correct and should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Gary A. Sargent 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Counter-Respondent 
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